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ECON30020 Mathematical Economics

Tutorial 2. More Logic and Proofs

Question 1. Involuntary unemployment

Consider a perfectly competitive labour market in which the demand and supply functions for labor as functions of the wage w, denoted D(w) and S(w) respectively, are such that the market clearing (or equilibrium) wage w*  is positive and induces a positive employment level Q*  = D(w* ) = S(w* ).  Assuming that D(w) is strictly decreasing in w and S(w) is strictly increasing, show that imposing a minimum wage w > w*  induces excess supply (or involuntary unemployment) and reduces employment below Q* .

Answer:

At w , demand for labour will be D(w ) which is less than Q*  = D(w* ) because D is strictly decreasing. Labour supply will be S(w ), which is larger than Q*  = S(w* ) because S is strictly increasing.  Hence, the employment level will be D(w ) < Q* ; firms are able to hire as many workers as they want.

Unfortunately, not all workers will be able to nd jobs. Involuntary unemployment (the excess supply of labour) will be

S(w ) D(w ) = [S(w ) Q*] + [Q* D(w )] > 0.

minimum wage in labour market

S(w), supply of labour

w

w*

D(w), demand for labour

unemployment

Question 2. Marriage market

Consider four women (Oprah, Prim, Rita, Sophie) and four men (Austin, Boris, Conan, Dishi), who have the following preferences:

Oprah: Boris > Austin > Dishi > Conan

Prim: Dishi > Conan > Austin > Boris

Rita: Austin > Dishi > Conan > Boris

Sophie: Boris > Austin > Dishi > Conan

Austin: Prim > Sophie > Oprah > Rita

Boris: Rita > Oprah > Sophie > Prim

Conan: Prim > Rita > Oprah > Sophie

Dishi: Sophie > Oprah > Rita > Prim

Assume that all men and women are heterosexual and (once married) monogamous.

(a) Find a matching by using Deferred Acceptance Algorithm  (DAA)  (Gale-Shapley algo-

rithm) with men proposing.

(b) Find a matching by using Gale-Shapley algorithm with women proposing.

(c)  Compare (a) and (b). When are women better off? When are men better off?

Answer:

(a)  Men proposing DAA.

Stage 1:

Women

proposed by

provisionally keeps

rejects

Oprah

Prim

Austin, Conan

Conan

Austin

Rita

Boris

Boris

Sophie

Dishi

Dishi

Stage 2:

Women

proposed by

provisionally keeps

rejects

Oprah

Prim

Conan

Rita

Boris

Sophie

Austin

Austin

Dishi

Stage 3:

Women

proposed by

matched with

Oprah

Dishi

Dishi

Prim

Conan

Rita

Boris

Sophie

Austin

Note that this matching is stable.

(b) Women proposing DAA.

Stage 1:

Men

proposed by

provisionally keeps

rejects

Austin

Rita

Rita

Boris

Oprah, Sophie

Oprah

Sophie

Conan

Dishi

Prim

Prim

Stage 2:

Men

proposed by

provisionally keeps

rejects

Austin

Sophie

Sophie

Rita

Boris

Oprah

Conan

Dishi

Prim

Stage 3:

Men

proposed by

provisionally keeps

rejects

Austin

Sophie

Boris

Oprah

Conan

Dishi

Rita

Rita

Prim

Stage 4:

Men

proposed by

matched with

Austin

Sophie

Boris

Oprah

Conan

Prim

Prim

Dishi

Rita


Note that this matching is stable.

(c)  Comparison:  as you can see from the table, women are weakly better off when they are proposing and men are weakly better off when men are proposing

People

match (man prop.)

choice #

match (woman prop.)

choice #

Oprah

Dishi

3rd

Boris

1st

Prim

Conan

2nd

Conan

2nd

Rita

Boris

4th

Dishi

3rd

Sophie

Austin

2nd

Austin

2nd

Austin

Sophie

2nd

Sophie

2nd

Boris

Rita

1st

Oprah

2nd

Conan

Prim

1st

Prim

1st

Dishi

Oprah

2nd

Rita

3rd