EFB337 Final Exam
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SECTION A
ATTEMPT ALL QUESTIONS IN THIS SECTION
THE TOTAL FOR THIS SECTION IS 25 MARKS
QUESTION 1
Suppose a car insurance company has determined that clients who prefer their coffee black, i.e., without milk or sugar, have a higher chance of getting involved in a serious car accident than those who drink their coffee with milk and sugar. In fact, it has been observed that those who drink their coffee black tend to drive more recklessly than those who do not, and the more reckless the driving, the greater the likelihood of accidents. But suppose that the insurance company has no way of determining their customers’ preferences over coffee, since it is a very personal piece of information not collected by the usual data collection agency. Suppose further that the insurance company has no way of ascertaining whether its customer was driving “recklessly” at the time of accident.
(a) Describe the informational asymmetry in this problem, i.e., whether there is any problem of moral hazard or adverse selection. If the insurer believes a customer has a 50% chance of being a black coffee drinker, would it succeed in breaking even if it offered a standard insurance policy with deductibles? (Recall that a “deductible” policy pays only a part of the damage in case of an accident; the customer pays the rest.)
(b) Now suppose the insurer asks its customers to state whether they like black coffee or not, when they purchase insurance policies from the firm. The insurer is unable to verify the truth as the customer can lie about their preferences if they want to. However, the insurer offers two different policies depending on their customers’ response. If the customer reveals a preference for black coffee, the insurer will charge a high premium, but will compensate the customer fully in case of an accident. If the customer does not reveal a preference for black coffee, the insurer will charge a low premium, but the customer will be compensated only partly if there is an accident. Explain why such a policy will work.
[Total for Question 1: 10 marks; each part of equal value]
QUESTION 2
Elizabeth owns a plot of land out in the country. Recently, five owners of neighbouring plots have discovered gold on their land and have begun mining operations. Elizabeth believes that there probably is gold on her land as well, but she has no desire to mine the land herself, nor does she have any idea just how much gold there is on her land. She has therefore decided to auction off her land to the highest bidder.
(a) Assume that each neighbour decides to bid on Elizabeth’s land. Also assume that each neighbour believes that the estimates of the value of the land by all the other neighbours are distributed uniformly on the interval beginning at 0 with a mean centred on the true value of the land – i.e., all values in the range in the interval [0, I], where I is the upper limit of the distribution, are equally likely. Neighbour A estimates the value of the land to be $250. Since Neighbour A does not know the upper limit of the distribution, they use the following formula to estimate it:
E = U + (I − U) , where n is the number of bidders, E is the highest estimate, U is the lower
limit of the distribution, and I is the upper limit of the distribution♣ . What amount should be bid in order to try to avoid the winner’s curse? {Hint: Recall that to avoid the winner’s curse, you should start by assuming that your estimate is the highest. In this case, therefore, assume E=250.}
(b) If the true value of the land was actually $200, how high would the auction winner’s estimate have to be to subject them to the winner’s curse even if they had bid optimally?
(c) Assume Elizabeth has a friend who is an eminent geologist whose opinion is always believed to be true. She asks her friend, to give her an estimate on the value of her land. The geologist reports back to Elizabeth, and tells her that the land does indeed have gold on it and it is worth $100 at a minimum and very likely more. Should Elizabeth make this information known to her neighbours before they submit their bids? Explain why or why not.
[Total for Question 2: 10 marks; each part of equal value]
QUESTION 3
Give short answers to two of the following questions:
(a) “What we hope will prevent a direct attack [on West Berlin] is Soviet awareness that we mean to defend our position in West Berlin, and that American troops, who are not numerous there, are our hostage to that intent” (American president John F. Kennedy answering a press question in 1961). Explain the nature of this strategy.
(b) On moving to Vienna in 1781, Mozart hoped for an imperial post but waited for the Emperor to call him, because “if one makes any move oneself, one receives less pay” (letter to his Father). Explain the nature of this strategy.
(c) The U.S. administration says to the Japanese government: “If you don’t open your auto parts market very soon, there is the risk that our Congress will pass some very protectionist legislation that will hurt your economy.” Explain the nature and purpose of this strategic move.
[Total for Question 3: 5 marks; parts selected of equal value]
SECTION B
ATTEMPT THREE (3) OUT OF FIVE (5) QUESTIONS IN THIS SECTION
THE TOTAL FOR THIS SECTION IS 75 MARKS
QUESTION 4
(a) Consider the following scenario. Carole is an animal-rights activist who owns a sanctuary called Large Cat Rescue, while Joe owns a zoo called Tiger Kingdom. There is an ongoing feud between them with Carole alleging abuse of animals in Tiger Kingdom while Joe counteracts with similar accusations about Large Cat Rescue. In a recent escalation of this feud, Carole sues Joe for making defamatory comments about her personal life on a social media forum called Rumorville. Five weeks from now a judge will decide whether or not Joe is guilty. If found guilty Joe will be ordered to pay $4 million in damages to Carole; if not, there will be no payment. However, Carole and Joe can settle out of court in the four weeks prior to the hearing, in which case they do not go to court in Week 5.
The negotiation for settlement proceeds as follows. In each week t e {1,2,3,4} Carole or Joe can make a settlement offer St and the other party has to decide whether to accept it. Carole and Joe take turns making offers; Carole makes offers in weeks 1 and 3, while Joe gets his turn in weeks 2 and 4. If the offer is accepted in any particular week, the game ends and Joe pays St (the amount decided in week t) to Carole.
Carole is risk-averse and her utility from receiving payment x is (x)1/2 . She does not discount future payoffs and does not incur any costs of negotiation for going to court. Joe, however, is risk- neutral and needs to pay a small fee c > 0 to lawyers for every week the negotiations take place.
Use backward induction to analyse the above scenario. For the purpose of your analysis you may assume a probability p=0.7 of Carole winning the court case if the negotiations are not settled. {Hint: Start with the scenario in week 5 and calculate payoffs using the expected utility model. It will be convenient to express payoffs in million-dollar units. Then work backwards to figure out the offer Joe will make in period 4, Carole in Week 3, Joe in Week 2 and Carole in Week 1.}
(b) Explain and discuss the following statement: “When more issues are on the table or more parties are participating, agreements may be easier to reach, but bargaining may be riskier or the agreements more difficult to enforce.”
[Total for Question 4: 25 marks; part (a) is 13 marks and part(b) is 12 marks]
QUESTION 5
(a) You are a corporate raider bidding for the sleepy company Zzz, Inc. You think the company is worth somewhere between $2 billion and $10 billion in the hands of the current Zzz management and regard all values in this range as equally likely. The current management knows the actual figure. You also believe that, whatever the value of the company now, in your hands the company will be worth 10% more than that. You want to make a positive expected profit from this deal. You tender a bid, and the current management will accept it if it is more than the actual value of the company in their hands, which is known to them.
(i) Should you bid $6 billion? Why, or why not?
(ii) What is the highest amount you should bid?
(b) You are a collector of Woolworth’s Lion King Ooshies set. You have the complete set and in addition you have an extra piece of the rare Sunset Simba. You are thinking of selling the Sunset Simba at an auction for the purpose of fundraising for your favourite charity. Answer the following:
(i) What type of auction structure (from English open-outcry, Dutch, first or second price sealed- bid varieties) will you choose if buyers are risk-neutral and buyer-beliefs are uncorrelated.
(ii) What type of auction structure will you choose if buyers are risk-averse?
(iii) What type of auction structure should you choose if buyers have correlated beliefs? In the above, provide comprehensive explanations for your answers.
[Total for Question 5: 25 marks; part (a) is 10 marks, part (b) is 15 marks]
QUESTION 6
Comment on the use of screening and signalling in situations characterised by asymmetric information. Construct your own unique example, distinct from examples in lectures and the textbook, to explain what is meant by ‘separation of types based on self-selection ’ and the ‘pooling of types ’. Your example must clearly illustrate the use of a screening/signalling device and the associated incentive compatibility or participation constraints. Also comment on the nature of costs involved in the presence of information asymmetry.
[Total for Question 6: 25 marks]
QUESTION 7
Two cities, Alphaville and Betaville are facing an outbreak of COVID- 19. The local authorities in these cities have implemented the government’s recommendation for containment, such as stay- at-home advisories, social distancing, restrictions on gatherings and on hoarding. However, residents of these cities fall into two types, those who are natural-born cooperators (phenotype SD) and follow all restrictions, and those who are not cooperative (phenotype NSD) and avoid following the restrictions whenever they can. The payoffs in random matchings of these phenotypes are respectively characterized in the two cities as follows:
Alphaville |
Column |
||
NSD |
SD |
||
Row |
NSD |
1 1 |
5, 0 |
SD |
0, 5 |
4 4 |
Betaville |
Column |
||
NSD |
SD |
||
Row |
NSD |
-3, -3 |
2, -2 |
SD |
-2, 2 |
1, 1 |
(a) Find the Evolutionary Stable States (ESS) in the respective cities. Assume in each case that a proportion p of the city is phenotype NSD while (1-p) is phenotype SD. Compare each outcome to the rational-play version of the game. Carefully explain and interpret the results of your analysis.
(b) Now consider the Alphaville population and assume there are repeated interactions, so that randomly matched players play the Alphaville game twice in succession. In such repeated interactions, there are two strategies available in the Alphaville population. The two strategies are A (always NSD) and T (start with SD in the first round, play Tit for Tat in the next round). Draw a payoff table for the twice-repeated case and find the ESS. Draw fitness graphs and analyse and interpret the condition under which T is fitter than A. In this case too you may assume a proportion p of the population plays A while (1-p) plays T. Compare the outcome with the rational-play version of the twice-repeated case.
(c) Now consider repeated interactions in the Betaville population, and perform an analysis similar to part (b).
(d) Now generalize the outcomes in parts (b) and (c) to the case of n repetitions. Again, consider the fitness of the strategies A (always NSD) with T (start with SD and play Tit for Tat in subsequent rounds). Compare and contrast the outcomes for Alphaville and Betaville. Comment on if, and how, repeated interactions facilitate the evolution of cooperation in the Alphaville and Betaville societies.
[Total for Question 7: 25 marks; each part of equal value]
QUESTION 8
Consider the following data, which summarizes the outcome of the Finnish Presidential Election of 2012
Candidate |
Party |
Political position |
First round |
Second round |
||
Votes |
% |
Votes |
% |
|||
Sauli Niinistö |
National Coalition Party |
Centre- right |
1,131,254 |
36.96 |
1,802,328 |
62.59 |
Pekka Haavisto |
Green League |
Centre-left |
574,275 |
18.76 |
1,077,425 |
37.41 |
Paavo Väyrynen |
Centre Party |
Centre |
536,555 |
17.53 |
|
|
Timo Soini |
True Finns |
Right |
287,571 |
9.40 |
||
Paavo Lipponen |
Social Democratic Party |
Centre-left |
205,111 |
6.70 |
||
Paavo Arhinmäki |
Left Alliance |
Left |
167,663 |
5.48 |
||
Eva Biaudet |
Swedish People's Party |
Centre |
82,598 |
2.70 |
||
Sari Essayah |
Christian Democrats |
Centre- right |
75,744 |
2.47 |
||
|
|
|
3,060,771 |
100.0 |
2,879,753 |
100.0 |
Source: https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/2012_Finnish_presidential_election
(a) Based on the distribution of votes in the first round, characterise the distribution of voters in the second round on the left-right political spectrum. Assume for simplicity that the second- round drop in voter turnout was distributed proportionally across the respective political positions so that the percentages in the first round can be considered reflective of the distribution in the second round. Identify the median voter’s political position in this distribution. {Hint: Use an analysis similar to the 2017 French presidential election, discussed in the week 12 lecture.} (8 marks)
(b) Critically examine the data using the lens of the Median Voter Theorem. (8 marks)
(c) Comment in general on the two-round majority runoff structure. Support your argument with real-world or hypothetical examples. Your focus should be on issues like strategic voting, and the potential for outcomes that do not reflect the overall preferences of the electorate, or any other anomalies/voting paradoxes in that that you think are pertinent to this voting method. (9 marks)
[Total for Question 8: 25 marks; marks for each part as indicated above]
2023-06-17