2023 EC334 Assessment
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2023 EC334 Assessment – due 1400 on 03/04/2023
Please do either questions 1-3 or question 4
A.1. Imagine that it is 2024 and that supplies of brie from France are about to be cut off. UK sales by a potential monopoly producer of domestic Brie are governed by the inverse demand curve P = 68.25 − 5Q, where Q is the quantity sold and P is the price; the producer must pay a marginal cost for milk, currently estimated at MC = £12.75. In 2025, this marginal cost will either increase to £28.25 (a rise of about 22%) or fall to £5 (a fall of about 39%); a cost reduction is twice as likely as a cost increase. The potential UK cheesemaker is considering investing in a factory that would start producing in 2025 (next year). The investment must be made in 2024 and will cost I0 = £125; the plant only operates for one year. The risk-free interest rate is Tf = 5%. Assume that all Brie price risk is diversifiable. You may treat 2024 as the current year.
To aid the evaluation, the firm’s advisor has noticed that stock in the dairy farmers’ cooperative, currently priced at P0(a) = £30 per share, is perfectly correlated with the potential profits of the new factory. If the cost of milk increases (due to climate change), the cooperative’s stock will fall to Pb(a) = £20 per share; if milk becomes cheaper, the cooperative’s stock will sell for Pga = £50 per share.
a. If the plant would only operate for one year (closing after 2025), should the firm make this investment? What is the associated WACC? [8 marks]
b. What would be the value to the firm of an option to delay the decision until the beginning of 2025 (when the price of milk will be known), assuming that the investment cost rises at half the riskless rate? What portfolio comprised of stock in the cooperative and riskless bonds would replicate the pattern of returns and price the option? [10 marks]
c. What is the value of an option to delay the decision for two years, assuming that no further delay is possible after that? You should assume that the price of milk will rise or fall again in 2026 by the same proportions (compared to 2025) as it did in 2025 (compared to 2024). Also, the cost of building the plant will again rise at half the riskless rate. Identify all decision points and the associated WACCs. [12 marks]
A.2. A government department is interested in persuading a private investor to buy the Britvolt battery plant, which is otherwise facing closure. The value of operating the plant will be determined by investor’s stake 几 and market forces (a random parameter 业 distributed uniformly on [0, 10]). The revenue function is R = 业几, the cost of the rescue plan is 冗22(一)1 and the investor’s outside option is > 0. The government needs to specify a contract paying the investor an amount P - if the site produces value R, the government gets R − P and the investor gets P . Suppose, moreover, that the investor must accept or reject the contract before observing 业, but chooses 几 after observing 业.
a. First assume that the government can observe R but cannot separately observe 几 or 业. You may assume that the contract takes the form P = aR where a is a (not necessarily positive) parameter. Find the investor’s optimal development as a function of a, and R, and use this to compute the value of a that maximises the government’s expected utility. Also, find the optimised expected value of the Britvolt plant (sum of expected payoffs to the government and the investor) as a function of . [12 marks]
b. How (if at all) would your answer differ if the investor observed 业 before accepting or rejecting the contract? [You need not solve this explicitly, but should clearly show how you would solve the problem.] [10 marks]
c. Now suppose that the government can either choose a contract that depends on 业 (P = F业) or one that depends on 几 (P = y几) but not both. In other words, it must pay off the investor before observing the value of R. As before, the investor accepts or rejects the offer before observing 业. Which would the government prefer to observe? [10 marks]
A.3. Company P has commissioned an economic forecast from consultancy A in order to choose the optimal level of investment in a new project. The profitability of the project depends on the level of investment I and on a random variable 业 (the state of the market). The consultancy can determine the correct value of 业, and will write a report informing the company, which will then choose I. The company believes that random variable 业 is uniformly distributed on the interval [0,10]. The payoff to the company from investment I in state 业 is
几P(I|业) = 1000 − (I − 业)2
The consultancy is paid a fixed amount F regardless of what it reports. However, it has a
hidden stake in the outcome of the project; its payoff if the company invests I in state 业 is 几A(I|业) = F − (I − 1.05业)2
Assume that F is fixed by law (i.e. not chosen by the company or the consultancy) and is small enough that the contract (commission) will always be offered and accepted.
a. Will the consultancy report truthfully? Why or why not? [4 marks]
b. What would you expect equilibrium to look like? [4 marks]
c. Find an equilibrium in which the consultant’s report is ignored; what will the company invest? [5 marks]
d. Now find an equilibrium in which the company responds to the report by making either a high or a low investment IHigh or ILow . Find these investment levels and the ‘trigger level’ of the consultant’s report above which the company will choose the high level of investment. [10 marks]
e. Are there more efficient equilibria (where the consultant’s report conveys more useful information – i.e., where the investment level is more sensitive to the report? For extra credit, can you find a formula for an equilibrium with three levels of investment? [10 marks]
f. Finally, can you describe an alternative fee structure for the consultant that would lead to an efficient outcome (where the company makes maximum use of the consultant’s information)? [5 marks]
A.4. Short essay (3000 words max) Credit ratings agencies (CRAs) contributed to the 2007-8 financial crisis; this has been attributed to a combination of market power (dominance by a few CRAs), inappropriate modelling and conflicts of interest. Discuss the case for regulation, and the likely risks and benefits of different approaches. How would you expect this issue to be affected by data analytics (and machine learning) used by regulators, CRAs and/or investors? [100 marks]
2023-03-20